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ARTICLES
KEEPING GIDEON’S PROMISE:
USING EQUAL PROTECTION TO ADDRESS
THE DENIAL OF COUNSEL
IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
Brandon Buskey* & Lauren Sudeall Lucas**
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants the right to counsel, and the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear
that right is applicable to all defendants in felony cases, even those unable
to afford a lawyer. Yet, for defendants facing misdemeanor charges, only
those defendants whose convictions result in incarceration are entitled to
the assistance of counsel.
The number of misdemeanor prosecutions has increased dramatically in
recent years, as have the volume and severity of collateral consequences
attached to such convictions; yet, the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence
in this area has remained stagnant. Critics of the doctrinal and pragmatic
problems created by the Court’s actual incarceration standard have
advocated for various reforms to better protect people accused of
misdemeanors, including redefinition or expansion of the right to counsel
and legislative changes that would cut back on incarceration and allow
states to better apportion their limited resources among defendants.
This Article offers a novel perspective, grounded in due process and
equal protection and a line of Supreme Court cases that guarantee equal
access to the courts. Viewed in that light, indigent misdemeanor defendants
denied counsel may not suffer from a Sixth Amendment violation under the
law as it stands, but they are deprived of meaningful access to the courts on
the basis of wealth. It suggests that reconceputalizing the plight of
misdemeanor defendants through the lens of due process and equal
protection may help to identify the most effective judicial and legislative
solutions to the crisis of “assembly line justice.”

* Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU Criminal Law Reform Project.
** Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; Faculty Director, Center
for Access to Justice. We are grateful to Teresa Enriquez, Charlie Gerstein, Norman
Lefstein, Alexandra Natapoff, John Rappaport, and Norman Reimer for their help and
thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 1972, Aubrey Scott walked into a Chicago criminal
courthouse, alone and unrepresented by an attorney.1 The purpose of the
proceeding was to determine whether there was probable cause to charge
Scott with petty theft for shoplifting eleven days earlier at an F.W.
Woolworth Company store.2 But there was a misunderstanding: when the
court asked Scott if he thought that he was going to be ready for trial,3 Scott
took this to mean if he was ready for trial right then, and he replied that he
was.4 The prosecution answered in kind, and the court, seeing no need for
delay, asked Scott to enter a plea.5 Scott pleaded not guilty.6 He then
waived a jury trial.7 No one bothered to inform Scott that he had a right to
counsel, whether or not he could afford one.8
Things moved quickly from there. At trial, a Woolworth’s security guard
testified to what he believed was Scott’s heist of an attaché case: a scheme
that required having a salesperson unlock the attaché case for him, followed
by Scott walking around the store for fifteen to twenty minutes with a tendollar bill in his hand, all while passing several other salespersons from
whom he could have made the purchase.9 The guard testified that after
seeing this, he walked out of the store through the main entrance, and Scott,
still holding the attaché case, walked out of the same door a few minutes
later.10 According to the guard’s testimony, he then ordered Scott back into
the store, at which point Scott claimed the case was his. A few of Scott’s
1. See People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881
(1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 519.
10. See id.
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personal belongings were in the case, which cost $12.95.11 Scott did not
cross-examine the officer.
Scott testified next. He claimed that he placed his belongings in the case
to see if they fit, which they did.12 He explained that he walked around the
store to find the salesperson that showed him the case, but she was no
longer there because that was not her usual post.13 Scott stated that he was
partially blind and could not find the salesperson after she left.14 According
to Scott, the security guard then came into the store from the main entrance
and accused him of shoplifting. Scott denied any wrongdoing and showed
the officer the money in his hand.15 A second officer arrived, grabbed
Scott, and the guards called the police.16
After Scott’s testimony, the prosecution rested.17 The court then asked
Scott how much money he had with him that day and whether he offered to
pay anyone.18 Scott replied that he had $300 on him that day and reiterated
that the $10 was for the salesperson.19 The court was unmoved. It flatly
declared, “I don’t believe you, sir. Finding of guilty.”20 During sentencing,
the prosecutor informed the court that Scott’s most recent offense was
another petty theft conviction from fourteen or fifteen years prior.21
Though Scott faced up to a year in jail,22 the court instead fined him $50,
which was promptly paid from Scott’s earlier bail of $100.23 Scott did not
spend a day in jail.
These circumstances raise a critical question: Did Scott receive a fair
trial? To answer that question, it is worth considering that, by the end of
the trial, Scott had likely been deprived of (1) his constitutional right to a
jury trial,24 (2) his constitutional right to an attorney at a preliminary
hearing,25 (3) his constitutional right to cross-examine the state’s witness,26
(4) his constitutional right against self-incrimination in testifying on his
own behalf,27 and (5) his constitutional right to any exculpatory evidence.28
Despite these deprivations, for many, the stronger intuitive factor would
be whether Scott had a viable defense. Things appear less promising for
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. The prior offense could have exposed Scott to a sentence between one and
five years. Id. at 520. But because the prosecution did not allege the prior conviction in the
complaint, perhaps inadvertently, Scott did not face the enhancement. Id. at 520 n.1.
23. See id. at 519.
24. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968).
25. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).
26. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
27. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
28. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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Scott on this front. The security guard’s account is straightforward and
damning, and, by comparison, Scott’s version is self-serving and
implausible. That is, until one confronts an issue that the court (and Scott)
neglected to examine: Why did the security guard leave the store? Scott’s
guilt or innocence arguably hinged on whether the guard confronted Scott
in the store (as Scott claimed) or outside (as the guard claimed). To believe
the guard’s account, one has to accept that, after he observed Scott take an
unlocked attaché case from a salesperson, walk around the store with the
opened bag for up to twenty minutes, and pass by several salespersons, the
guard concluded that, in a large department store likely to have multiple
exits, the most appropriate security measure was to . . . turn around and go
outside.
Once one begins to doubt the guard’s decision to ignore an obvious
potential shoplifter, other questions arise: Was the guard exaggerating the
amount of time he observed Scott? Was the guard outside the whole time
and either did not have as good a view of events as he claimed or simply
testified to facts that he had been told by another employee? And if the
guard was outside the whole time, how did he know that Scott did not pay
for the case inside?
Now consider what a defense attorney may have done to develop Scott’s
case. She could have spoken with salespersons to see how their accounts
squared with the guard’s, obtained any security camera footage from the
store (at least in modern times), verified whether Scott actually had a vision
problem, and corroborated whether he had additional money on him, say,
with a recent bank receipt. Using her familiarity with the Cook County jury
pool, she then could have determined if a jury of Scott’s peers might be
persuaded to reject the state’s case. She also could have advised Scott not
to take the stand if he was not credible in describing events or if the state’s
case was too weak to take the risk.
Had the attorney concluded that Scott was likely to be convicted at trial,
she could have sought a plea bargain. Using leverage like the guard’s
potential vulnerability on the stand, or appealing to the fact that the store
got its bag back, she could have requested that the prosecution either
dismiss the case outright or divert the case for later dismissal if Scott stayed
out of trouble. Or she could have asked the prosecution to reduce or amend
the charges to avoid Scott receiving another theft conviction. This would
prevent him from receiving an enhanced sentence should something like
this happen again. All told, much could have been done, or at least
attempted, by defense counsel to change the outcome for Scott.
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually heard Scott’s case in Scott v.
Illinois.29 The Court had previously held in the landmark decision Gideon
v. Wainwright30 that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to
counsel “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” applied to the states in felony

29. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2017]

KEEPING GIDEON’S PROMISE

2303

cases.31 The Court later held in Argersinger v. Hamlin32 that the right also
applies against the state in misdemeanor cases where the defendant receives
a jail sentence. That left cases such as Scott’s, where the defendant is
convicted of a misdemeanor but receives only a fine.
However, while the Court had gradually expanded the right to counsel
for decades, it abruptly halted that expansion with Scott. Without any
mention of the underlying facts of Scott’s case, the Court concluded that
counsel is only required for a misdemeanor offense when an individual is
actually incarcerated.33 Scott’s trial was, therefore, fundamentally fair
because the result was sufficiently minor.
Mr. Scott’s plight is perhaps best characterized as the anti-Gideon in our
national saga of the right to counsel. For many, Gideon promised a
criminal justice system that would provide all accused with competent
counsel.34 But this was only one aspect of Gideon’s deeper promise “to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law.”35 Fifty-four years later, these promises have gone
unfulfilled, as states have chronically underfunded their public defender
systems, leaving countless defendants either without counsel or with
counsel in name only.36 Yet those to whom Gideon grants a right to
counsel may at least hope the country will eventually live up to its
obligations under the Sixth Amendment. Those to whom Scott denies a
right to counsel have no such hope; their ability to obtain a fair proceeding
remains unequal. Thus, while Gideon represents a promise unfulfilled,
Scott more accurately represents a promise denied, the promise of a truly
equal justice system for all.
This Article seeks a new ending to the story of the anti-Gideon. It argues
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott is fundamentally flawed insofar
as it misunderstands counsel’s role in securing fair treatment of
misdemeanor defendants in today’s criminal justice system. The lawyer’s
role, whether in a case like Scott or Gideon, is much broader than ensuring
the accuracy or reliability of the proceedings.37 Providing a lawyer to a
31. Id. at 339, 345.
32. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
33. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74.
34. See, e.g., Michael Piccarreta, President’s Messag, ARIZ. ATT’Y (Mar. 1997),
http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/Archives/March97/3-97d1.htm [https://perma.cc/ZZA
4-QSUR].
35. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”).
36. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013).
37. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, (2006), the Court concluded that
“erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice [constituted] structural error.” Id. at
150. In so holding, the Court reflected on the various ways that the assistance of counsel
may affect a defendant’s case:
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation and
discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation
of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury argument. And the
choice of attorney will affect whether and on what terms the defendant cooperates
with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial. In light of
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defendant unable to afford one also fulfills the commands of fundamental
fairness and equal justice embodied in the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.38 But the Court’s focus in right to counsel cases since
Gideon has veered away from fundamental fairness and toward a more
individual, rights-oriented approach under the Sixth Amendment that
privileges the accuracy of criminal adjudications over concerns about
fairness.39 This focus on the individual’s right to a lawyer and on the
lawyer’s role with respect to accuracy under the Sixth Amendment
underemphasizes systemic inequality and breeds differential treatment
based on wealth.40
The metastasis of our “assembly line” criminal justice system and the
increase in penalties like fees and fines—as well as the myriad other ways
that a prior conviction or arrest may affect later interactions with the
system—in the years since Scott demonstrates that the actual incarceration
standard is inherently unfair to indigent defendants. Yet the Court has
shown little appetite for revisiting Scott’s interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment.
Thus, this Article’s primary basis for abandoning the actual incarceration
standard is not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rather, it is the
guarantee of equal access to the courts secured by the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrine is
interwoven throughout the Court’s early right to counsel cases and
establishes that states may not create dual systems of criminal justice,
wherein meaningful access to the system is only granted to those who can
afford it. The argument we set forth below is therefore not merely an
alternative to arguments based purely on the Sixth Amendment but instead
“a return to the roots of the fundamental right of access to justice.”41
Experiences like those of Scott are almost exclusively those of people who
cannot afford an attorney. Only these people risk being forced into court
these myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of counsel bears
directly on the framework within which the trial proceeds, or indeed on whether it
proceeds at all. It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected
counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different
choices on the outcome of the proceedings. Many counseled decisions, including
those involving plea bargains and cooperation with the government, do not even
concern the conduct of the trial at all. Harmless-error analysis in such a context
would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate
universe.
Id.
38. See Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215–16
(2003) (“Throughout the early due process cases comprising the infancy of constitutional
criminal procedure, the Court demonstrated not only an interest in securing accurate
determinations of guilt for state criminal defendants, but also an obvious concern about the
relationship between the structure of criminal courts and the social and political legitimacy
of American democracy.”).
39. Id. at 216–17.
40. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1242–43 (2013) (contrasting the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel with the right to meaningful review grounded in the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
41. Id. at 1201.
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without a lawyer and branded as criminals, with all the consequences that
stigma brings. By contrast, the wealthy are entirely insulated from such
harms, as they are free to retain an attorney regardless of the Court’s
interpretation of what the Sixth Amendment requires. By virtue of that
ability, they experience an entirely different system of justice.
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s decisions establishing
the right to counsel and the actual incarceration standard. It also critiques
the doctrinal and practical shortcomings of the Court’s opinion in Scott and
explains why the resulting actual incarceration standard is premised on a
fundamental misunderstanding of today’s criminal justice system. Next,
Part II describes responses offered to address such critiques and the
obstacles to replacing Scott with a new Sixth Amendment standard. Then,
Part III provides an overview of the Court’s access to courts jurisprudence,
grounded in equal protection and due process, and examines why it requires
abandoning the actual incarceration standard, as well as some of the
alternative Sixth Amendment proposals that have been offered to replace
Scott. This Article concludes by explaining why the right to meaningful
access requires a right to counsel for most, if not all, criminal defendants
but can also be satisfied by removing certain petty offenses from the
criminal code altogether.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
Part I.A provides an overview of the Court’s right to counsel
jurisprudence, including the limitations on the right as applied to
misdemeanor defendants. Ultimately, only misdemeanor defendants who
are subject to actual incarceration are entitled to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. Part I.B explains why that standard is problematic from both
a doctrinal and a practical standpoint.
A. The Right to Counsel as Currently Defined
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel, that right
did not apply to those facing prosecution in state courts until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Powell v. Alabama.42 In Powell, the Court held that in
the context of state capital cases, due process required the assistance of
counsel,43 explaining:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.44

42. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
43. Id. at 71.
44. Id. at 68–69.

2306

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

It was not until three decades later that the Court recognized a categorical
right to counsel beyond the confines of capital litigation.45 In Gideon,
relying on the notion that appointment of counsel is a “fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial” and necessary to safeguard liberty,46 the Court
extended the right to apply to defendants facing felony charges in state
court.47
In Argersinger, the Court recognized that the right to counsel also
applied to some misdemeanor prosecutions.48 The Court did not apply the
right to all misdemeanors; instead, the right applies only to those
misdemeanor prosecutions that result in incarceration.49 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Lewis Powell took issue with the Court’s decision to draw
the line at incarceration, recognizing that other consequences of conviction,
such as losing one’s driver’s license, may be just as impactful for the
In doing so, he acknowledged the equal protection
individual.50
implications of a rule that turns on incarceration, explaining:
There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual
defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has determined in
advance to leave open the option of imprisonment. Thus, an accused
indigent would be entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts
in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense would
have no counsel. Since the services of counsel may be essential to a fair
trial even in cases in which no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this
type of pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.51

Powell suggested that due process and principles of fundamental fairness
demand a case-by-case evaluation of the complexity of the offense, the
probable sentence if convicted, and any factors specific to the individual
case suggesting the need for a lawyer.52
Despite Powell’s concerns, the Court confirmed in Scott that the right to
counsel would be dependent on incarceration. At issue in Scott was
45. The Court did, however, recognize a right to counsel for noncapital federal
defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–42 (1963).
47. Id. at 345.
48. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1972).
49. Id. at 37 (“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”).
50. Id. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The consequences of a misdemeanor
conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions
found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’ Serious consequences
also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may attach to a
drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run escapade. Losing one’s driver’s license is more
serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail.”).
51. Id. at 54. Justice Powell also pointed out that the Court’s ruling would emphasize
the line between those able to qualify as indigent and those who are barely self-sufficient
economically: while the former would be entitled to counsel for even the simplest of petty
offenses (when even nonindigents would decline to hire an attorney), the latter would be
unable to afford counsel, even when essential to providing an effective defense. Id. at 49–50.
52. Id. at 47, 64.
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whether a defendant charged with an offense for which imprisonment was
authorized but not actually imposed had a right to counsel.53 Affirming the
state court’s holding below, the Court refused to extend Argersinger to
require the appointment of counsel in such cases.54 In doing so, the Court
reasoned that “actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines
or the mere threat of imprisonment” and that any extension of Argersinger’s
workable bright-line rule “would create confusion and impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse
States.”55
The rule set forth in Scott—that a criminal defendant in state court is
entitled to the appointment of counsel only if his conviction results in
incarceration—remains the law today. This is true even though the text of
the Sixth Amendment refers broadly to “all criminal prosecutions”56 and, as
Justice Powell argued in Argersinger, collateral consequences of conviction
may be just as, if not more, severe than incarceration.57 Just this past May,
for example, a federal judge in New York sentenced a woman to probation
rather than prison after she was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine
and possession with intent to distribute, finding that the collateral
consequences she would face as a convicted felon were a severe enough
form of punishment.58
In Alabama v. Shelton,59 an Alabama state court’s application of
Argersinger and Scott in the context of a suspended sentence added another
layer to the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence. After representing
himself in a bench trial, LeReed Shelton was convicted in an Alabama
circuit court of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to thirty days in jail.60
The trial court immediately suspended the sentence, placing Shelton on
probation.61 The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel did apply to
a defendant in Shelton’s situation and that a suspended sentence that may
end in imprisonment also could not be imposed without the assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.62 Shelton’s remedy, however,
53. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979).
54. Id. at 373–74.
55. Id. at 373.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
57. See Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral
Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1170 (2015); see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325–26 (2012) (demonstrating that a misdemeanor
conviction can bar eligibility for many professional licenses, render an individual ineligible
for public housing, make the offender ineligible for health care programs, require enrollment
in a sex offender registry, lead to deportation, and affect child custody, food stamp
eligibility, and the right to vote).
58. See United States v. Nesbeth, No. 15-CR-18, 2016 WL 3022073 (E.D.N.Y. May 24,
2016); see also Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge, in Striking Move, Sentences Felon to
Probation, Not Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016, at A21.
59. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
60. See id. at 655–58.
61. Id. at 658.
62. Id. The rationale for this distinction is that “revocation of probation would trigger a
prison term imposed for a misdemeanor of which Shelton was found guilty without the aid
of counsel.” Id. at 664.
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provided only a partial victory. Though the Court’s decision invalidated
Shelton’s suspended sentence, it left his conviction intact.63 Shelton
therefore remained vulnerable to any collateral consequences of his
conviction.
B. How Scott Misconceptualized the Role
of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott, to limit the right to counsel to
those defendants who are actually incarcerated, suffers from numerous
doctrinal and practical flaws. Doctrinally, Scott represents a dramatic
overreach by the Court to halt the expansion of the right to counsel. More
troubling, the Court’s reasoning also reveals an unwillingness to grapple
with questions of fundamental fairness in misdemeanor cases. Thus, this
section aims to provide context for why the problems facilitated by Scott
demand not simply a technical readjustment of the right to counsel but
instead a reframing of why the right to counsel is so fundamental—to all
defendants—and cannot turn solely on the question of incarceration.
In Argersinger, the Court held that no defendant could be incarcerated
unless he had been represented by counsel.64 Subsequently, in Scott, the
Court’s analysis turned on whether Argersinger’s focus on imprisonment
represented “a point in a moving line or a holding that States are required to
go only so far in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants.”65 The Scott
Court thus framed its central question as whether actual imprisonment was
a necessary condition for counsel’s appointment or whether the mere
possibility of incarceration would suffice. A far more conservative view of
Argersinger is available, however, based on the specific context in which it
was decided.
At issue in Argersinger was the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, like the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, “extends only to trials ‘for non-petty offenses punishable by more than
six months imprisonment.’”66 The Court ultimately reversed the lower
court’s decision.67 In doing so, it rejected the Florida court’s equivalence
of the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial, determining that the
respective histories of the two rights revealed that the right to counsel was
broader and more fundamental than the right to a jury.68 Indeed, looking
back to English common law, the Court emphasized that there has been a

63. Id. at 659–60.
64. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
65. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979).
66. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27 (quoting State ex rel. Argersigner v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d
442, 443 (Fla. 1970), rev’d, 407 U.S. 25).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 30 (“While there is historical support for limiting the ‘deep commitment’ to
trial by jury to ‘serious criminal cases,’ there is no such support for a similar limitation on
the right to assistance of counsel.”); see also id. at 30–31 (“We reject, therefore, the premise
that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may
be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.”).
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longer tradition of guaranteeing the right to counsel for misdemeanor cases
than for felonies.69
Given the Court’s tendency to confine its decisions to the facts
presented,70 if Argersinger represented a limit on how far states had to go in
providing counsel, that limit was to require actual incarceration for
counsel’s appointment only in petty offense cases, like Argersinger’s,
where a defendant has no right to a jury. This would be consistent with the
reasoning that, given the more fundamental nature of the right to counsel,
where a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, he must necessarily have a right
to an attorney. But, more importantly, it is unlikely that the Argersinger
Court viewed itself as establishing an actual incarceration standard at all.
Although the Argersinger Court declined to declare counsel necessary in all
petty offense cases, it acknowledged that the penalty states attach to a
particular charge is an inadequate proxy for the complexities of the defense:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a
petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and
constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a
person can be sent off for six months or more.71

The Court went on to state explicitly that “the problems associated with
misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to
insure the accused a fair trial.”72 Yet the Court never explained why actual
incarceration is the proper measure of the need for counsel in a petty case.
This omission most likely resulted from the Court’s belief that “[it] need
not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right
to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner
was in fact sentenced to jail.”73 Whatever the answer to the question of its
propriety, nothing in Argersinger suggests that the Court intended for the
actual incarceration standard to apply to nonpetty cases, and there is ample
evidence that the Court did not intend actual incarceration as the final
standard for all misdemeanors.74
This narrowed understanding of Argersinger—that, if it applies at all, the
actual incarceration standard applies only to petty offenses—significantly
recasts the question in Scott. Though he ultimately received only a fine,
Scott faced a year in jail on a theft charge.75 On this latter fact alone, Scott
69. Id. at 30.
70. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (noting that, in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court “did by its language, as this Court frequently does,
limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case”).
71. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33.
72. Id. at 36–37.
73. Id. at 37. Argersinger was sentenced to ninety days in jail; he was charged with
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a
$1,000 fine, or both. Id. at 26.
74. See, e.g., id. at 52 (Powell. J., concurring) (“Thus, although the new rule is extended
today only to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's opinion foreshadows the
adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses.”).
75. And but for the prosecutor’s omission of Scott’s prior theft conviction from the
charging document, he would have faced felony charges. People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517,
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should have prevailed on the argument that he had a right to counsel for his
“nonpetty” theft prosecution. Seven Justices on the Scott Court at some
point supported this constitutional line: Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist in Argersinger, and Justices
William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, and Harry
Blackmun in Scott.76 As Justice Powell forcefully declared in his
Argersinger concurrence, while
[a]n unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled
facts[,] . . . before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal
the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf
of the defendant.77

In fact, five Justices either expressly or impliedly supported this
constitutional line in Scott.78
But Scott lost 5–4. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist abandoned
his stance with Justice Powell in Argersinger. He instead focused the
analysis on Scott’s fine-only sentence, declaring: “[W]e believe that the
central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”79
However, only a plurality of the Court was convinced of Argersinger’s
supposed central premise. The remaining five Justices deeply questioned it.
Justice Powell, whose concurrence provided the decisive fifth vote,
maintained that the actual incarceration standard was not constitutionally
required and expressed “continuing reservations” about Argersinger.80 He
explained that “the drawing of a line based on whether there is
519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Had this
occurred, he undoubtedly would have had a right to counsel.
76. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40–42 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Were I able to
confine my focus solely to the burden that States will have to bear in providing counsel, I
would be inclined, at this stage of the development of the constitutional right to counsel, to
conclude that there is much to commend drawing the line at penalties in excess of six
months’ confinement.”); id. at 45–46 (Powell, J., concurring in the result, joined by Justice
Rehnquist) (“It is clear that whenever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be
drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due
process right to a jury trial. . . . Moreover, the interest protected by the right to have guilt or
innocence determined by a jury . . . while important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee
of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.”); see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 380 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens) (endorsing Justice Powell’s concurrence
in Argersinger); id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“For substantially the reasons stated
by Mr. Justice Brennan . . . I would hold that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those
Amendments.”).
77. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring) (adhering to his concurrence in
Argersinger, and noting that only “four Justices have reaffirmed [Argersinger] today”); id. at
380 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens); id. at 389 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 373 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
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imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of
precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction
can have more serious consequences.”81 Nonetheless persuaded to join the
majority by the need to provide lower courts clear guidance and the dictates
of stare decisis, Powell expressed hope that the Court would one day revisit
Argersinger.82
Scott’s actual incarceration standard cannot be reconciled with several of
the Court’s decisions addressing the rights of defendants to a fair criminal
process. For one, Scott upends the Justices’ apparent conviction in
Argersinger that the right to counsel should sweep more broadly than the
right to a jury trial. That is now only true for petty offenses, insofar as
Argersinger grants the right to counsel to some misdemeanor defendants
facing incarceration, none of whom would have a right to a jury trial. But
Scott reverses matters for nonpetty offenses, in that it denies the right to
counsel to misdemeanor defendants not facing incarceration, but who
would have a right to a jury trial. The Scott majority made no attempt to
reconcile this result with the history of the Sixth Amendment or the
practical relationship between the two rights.
Scott also creates a curious tension with the right to counsel on appeal.
Sixteen years before Scott, the Court held in Douglas v. California83 that, if
a state chooses to grant criminal defendants an appeal as a matter of right
from their convictions, the state must also provide counsel on
appeal to those unable to afford it.84 Douglas derives from the Court’s
access to courts line of decisions under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed further in Part
III.85 Those cases forbid states from creating invidious barriers in the
criminal justice system based on wealth. The Douglas Court deemed the
right to counsel necessary to prevent an appeal from becoming a
“meaningless ritual” for those unable to afford an attorney.86
The Court has never suggested that the right to counsel on appeal turns
on whether the defendant was incarcerated for the conviction, and none of
the states or the federal government condition the right to appeal on
incarceration. Scott thus creates the odd possibility that a defendant may be
denied the right to counsel at trial, yet that defendant would still be entitled
to appellate counsel to challenge the uncounseled conviction. This is
precisely what happened to Aubrey Scott, who successfully petitioned
Illinois for appointed appellate counsel and a free transcript.87 It is
unsurprising and perhaps ironic that Scott, unable to mount an effective pro
se defense in the trial court, could raise only one viable claim on appeal:
the fact that he was forced to proceed pro se in the trial court. Scott
81. Id.
82. Id. at 375.
83. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
84. Id. at 357–58.
85. See infra Part III.A.
86. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
87. People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881
(1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367.
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subsequently eliminated the one challenge an uncounseled defendant could
reliably mount against his conviction. As Justice Burger explained in his
Argersinger concurrence: “Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled
trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since the die is usually
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial record.”88 Despite
this warning, no justice on the Scott Court addressed the fact that its
decision might render an appeal of an uncounseled conviction the same sort
of meaningless ritual that Douglas was intended to prevent.
Although decided in a different context, Scott also seems inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent guaranteeing the right to pursue postappeal
remedies in federal court based on the presumption that convictions carry
collateral consequences.89 Specifically, the Court has long allowed a
criminal defendant who has been released on his sentence to maintain a
federal habeas corpus action challenging his conviction.90 This is allowed
even though the primary purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy unlawful
detention.91 Eleven years prior to Scott, the Court in Carafas v. LaVallee92
rejected a mootness challenge to the federal habeas petition of a released
New York defendant because
[i]n consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain
businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified
period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he
cannot serve as a juror. Because of these “disabilities or burdens [which]
may flow from” petitioner’s conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the
judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence
imposed on him.”93

Those denied counsel under Scott likely never had the chance to initiate a
habeas action and could not directly rely on Carafas. Yet, their interests in
avoiding a conviction rival those of noncustodial habeas petitioners seeking
to undo their convictions. So while not directly relevant, Carafas creates
additional tension with the Scott plurality’s conclusion that actual
incarceration is the only definitive factor in defining the right to counsel.
Beyond these doctrinal failings, Scott has aged poorly in light of changed
realities. The extent to which noncarceral penalties have multiplied and
grown since Scott cannot be overstated. Much of the recent criminal justice
reform movement has focused on the growth of the nation’s incarcerated
population. Nationally, however, probation is the leading form of
correctional control, covering 56 percent of people in the criminal justice

88. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 92–93.
90. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968) (finding a federal habeas
claim not moot upon the petitioner’s release, given the collateral consequences of
conviction).
91. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (“In recent decades, we have been
willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral
consequences . . . .”).
92. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
93. Id. at 237.

2017]

KEEPING GIDEON’S PROMISE

2313

system.94 The use of fines and fees has expanded dramatically as well95
and has become particularly pervasive among low-level offenses, including
misdemeanors.96
John P. Gross asserts that “[t]he Court’s reasoning in Argersinger and
Scott needs to be viewed against the backdrop of a criminal justice system
which, at the time, imposed three distinct penalties: incarceration, fines, or
probation.”97 That framework does not adequately account for the extent to
which the web of collateral consequences stemming from conviction has
grown. While a misdemeanor conviction already carried significant
consequences when the Court decided Argersinger,98 those consequences
are nothing like what they are today. Critics calling for the Court to
abandon the actual incarceration standard frequently cite the exponential
increase in the number and severity of collateral consequences that states
and the federal government now attach to misdemeanors.99 These civil
penalties include immigration consequences like detention and deportation;
loss of employment; loss of public benefits, including housing; loss of child
custody; revocation of professional licenses; and ineligibility for student
financial aid.100 Many of these consequences have a far broader reach and
impact on individuals’ lives than one or two days behind bars. States are
also increasingly attaching various supervision or treatment requirements to
minor offenses through diversion and specialized courts to increase state
control over defendants with chronic behavioral issues, such as drug

94. See Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Correctional Control: Incarceration and
Supervision by State, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 1, 2016), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/50statepie.html [https://perma.cc/HXJ4-AREZ].
95. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 3 (2015),
http://nacmconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue
_brief.pdf (“A recent study estimates that tens of millions of individuals in the United States
have been assessed fines or fees as part of the punishment for a criminal offense. The use of
these practices has increased substantially over time; in 1986, 12 percent of those
incarcerated were also fined, while in 2004 this number had increased to 37 percent. When
including fees as well, the total rises to 66 percent of all prison inmates. In 2014, 44 States
charged offenders for probation and parole supervision, up from 26 in 1990.”)
[https://perma.cc/TP3F-2B69].
96. Id. (“While the use of fines and fees has grown for all sentencing groups, they
remain more common in cases of misdemeanors, infractions, and other relatively less serious
crimes than in cases of felonies.”).
97. John P. Gross, What Matters More: A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 80 (2013) (noting that “our modern criminal justice system
has a wide range of enmeshed penalties that result from a criminal conviction”).
98. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (acknowledging Justice
Powell’s critique that some collateral consequences may be worse than a brief jailing).
99. Since the 1990s, the federal government and state legislatures have significantly
increased the volume of collateral consequences that attach to misdemeanor convictions,
such as sex offender registration, firearms prohibitions, and deportation. See Paul T. Crane,
Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 790–93 (2016); see also Gross,
supra note 97, at 55; John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1, 22 (2013).
100. See Gross, supra note 97, at 82–84; King, supra note 99, at 24–34.
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addiction.101 Consequently, some have deemed the combined effects of the
penalties that follow a conviction a “civil death.”102
Most prominent in these attacks on Scott’s continued viability is the
degree to which Congress has authorized immigration detention and
deportation for minor offenses.103 These critics root their argument in the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,104 which held that
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel places an
obligation on defense counsel to inform defendants of certain immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction.105 Echoing Justice Powell’s critique
of actual incarceration as the proper proxy for the need for counsel, the
Padilla Court recognized that civil immigration consequences are “an
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.”106 The Court had earlier acknowledged this dynamic in INS v. St.
Cyr,107 where it observed that “[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in
the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail
sentence.”108 Though the Court most likely did not intend that by
expanding the right to effective assistance in Padilla it was also expanding
the antecedent right to counsel, the decision nonetheless creates an
untenable paradox in light of Scott: while a defendant may have the right to
an attorney’s advice about immigration consequences, an indigent
defendant may not be entitled to counsel to provide that advice.
Another major practical consequence of Scott’s actual incarceration
standard is that it risks effectively giving the prosecution control over a
defendant’s right to counsel. One of the principal critiques of Scott is that it
requires judges to decide prior to trial, and without a full understanding of
the evidence, whether jail would be appropriate upon conviction.109 Justice
101. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1086 (2015).
102. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era
of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012); see also Wayne A. Logan,
Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1112 n.72 (2013).
103. See, e.g., Note, “A Prison Is a Prison Is a Prison”: Mandatory Immigration
Detention and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 129 HARV. L. REV. 522, 522 (2015)
(arguing for a right to counsel for those facing mandatory immigration detention); see also
Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 598
(2011).
104. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
105. Id. at 374.
106. Id. at 364.
107. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
108. Id. at 323 (quoting 3 MATTHEW BENDER, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 60A.01
(1999)).
109. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 369, 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Under the
‘actual imprisonment’ standard, ‘[t]he judge will . . . be forced to decide in advance of
trial—and without hearing the evidence—whether he will forego entirely his judicial
discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to
consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature.’” (quoting Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 53 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring))); see also id. at 374 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting that in lieu of the unrealistic possibility of providing counsel in all cases,
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Powell argued in his Argersinger concurrence that this would directly
undermine the legislature’s sentencing prerogatives, as judges would
inevitably “divide petty offenses into two categories—those for which
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in which no such
sentence will be given regardless of the statutory authorization.”110
Experience suggests the problem is worse than feared. The more
common scenario is that judges, overwhelmed by swelling misdemeanor
dockets, simply defer to prosecutors’ representations about the propriety of
jail time, rather than conduct their own independent inquiry.111 In places
like Miami, prosecutors can wield jail time as a tactical weapon to eliminate
a defendant’s right to counsel on the eve of trial.112 This happens because
most judges make no inquiry into whether a defendant may be severely
prejudiced by removing an attorney who has devoted significant resources
to defending a client.
Ironically, the Argersinger Court foreshadowed this development. In
helping to popularize the term “assembly-line justice,” now used to describe
much of what happens in criminal, but especially misdemeanor, courts, the
Court warned that “the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number
than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions,
regardless of the fairness of the result.”113 The volume of misdemeanor
prosecutions has dramatically increased in the decades since
Argersinger.114 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’s
seminal report on the dysfunctions of misdemeanor courts estimates that the
number of misdemeanor cases in the United States doubled from 5 million
in 1972 to 10.5 million in 2006.115 This flood of cases creates toxic judicial
ecosystems where 70 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty without
counsel in proceedings that often last under three minutes.116

particularly in jurisdictions with crowded dockets or without many lawyers, judges will be
forced to forgo the option to impose a sentence of imprisonment after conviction); WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a), at 712 (6th ed. 2017) (“A major
objection advanced against an actual imprisonment standard was that it would require the
magistrate . . . to ‘prejudge’ the case in determining whether appointed counsel was
necessary.”); King, supra note 99, at 15 (“Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland,
judges in low-level cases are invited to decide in some respect the sentence before the
trial.”).
110. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 311 (2011).
112. See infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. Even though Florida is a jurisdiction
in which counsel is required if imprisonment is possible and not only when it is actually
imposed, its continued reliance on incarceration makes such a tactic possible. See State v.
Kelly, 999 So.2d 1029 (2009); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(b)(1).
113. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.
114. See, e.g., King, supra note 99, at 22.
115. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 11 (2009), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB6U-F7BC].
116. ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREEMINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011), https://
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Due process becomes an afterthought under such conditions.117 First
sacrificed in today’s misdemeanor assembly lines is our criminal justice
Prosecutors,
system’s commitment to the adversarial system.118
undisputedly the most powerful courtroom actor under normal conditions,
acquire new sources of authority in overburdened misdemeanor courts.
Merely by removing the possibility of jail, a prosecutor can literally render
a misdemeanor arrestee defenseless. And forgoing the possibility of jail has
become an increasingly minor sacrifice for prosecutors, a reality driven by
two key developments in the criminal system: (1) the rise in the number
and severity of collateral consequences for misdemeanors and (2) the
criminal system’s overwhelming reliance on plea bargaining.
Paul T. Crane explains that “prosecutors will often be attuned to certain
collateral consequences that further the goals of criminal prosecution,
especially those aimed at reducing threats to public safety. When it comes
to low-level offenses, those collateral consequences are often the most
important goal of a criminal prosecution.”119 More broadly, as Issa KohlerHausmann has noted, the misdemeanor justice system has shifted away
from adjudicating guilt to a system increasingly used to “mark, classify, and
supervise people” even without securing an immediate conviction or jail
sentence.120 The result is that prosecutors now enjoy increased power to
secure many types of dispositions beyond jail that mark defendants for later
encounters with the justice system.121 If a defendant is convicted, for
example, after failing to satisfy the requirements of a diversion program, the
consequences of such marking become dire, because a misdemeanor
conviction, even one that is uncounseled, may be used to increase the
penalty for a subsequent offense.122 This possibility may incentivize a
prosecutor to offer no jail time on something like an individual’s first
driving while under the influence (DUI) charge, knowing that she will be
able to pursue stiffer penalties the next go around.
Also, collateral consequences—which often apply for years and
frequently for life—typically outlast the often minimal periods of

www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20794&libID=20764 [https://perma.cc/
A2YR-KF2Y].
117. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 115, at 7.
118. While some courts may participate in “assembly line justice,” in which cases are
handled quickly and indiscriminately, other misdemeanor courts engage in what Issa KohlerHausmann has termed “managerial justice,” which is “rapid and informal, but . . . not
random or mechanical.” See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 622–24 (2014) (explaining that the managerial model
of processing mass misdemeanors, unlike the adjudicative model, is not triggered by a
finding of guilt but is instead concerned with managing the engagement of individuals with
the criminal justice system—in terms of both degree and extent—over time).
119. Crane, supra note 99, at 795.
120. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 118, at 643.
121. See id. at 645–48.
122. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994); see also Kohler-Hausmann,
supra note 118, at 644 (“Marks are used inside the system to signify what level of response
is warranted and what other sorts of testing or punishments will be imposed in the context of
later encounters.”).
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incarceration for misdemeanors.123 Returning to the first-time DUI
example, a prosecutor may prioritize suspending the defendant’s license for
a year over seeking jail time, especially if she knows the judge is unlikely to
impose jail on a first-time offender. Finally, where the collateral
consequence takes the form of a prohibition or obligation—such as
abstaining from carrying a gun or registering as a sex offender—violating
the collateral consequence often results in a separate, and more easily
proven, offense that may result in jail time.124
With collateral consequences creating such severe civil disabilities for
misdemeanants compared to jail time, prosecutors are free to prioritize
efficiency in their decisions about whether to seek incarceration.125 As with
most assembly lines, efficiency nearly always trumps quality. The United
States’s broken system for providing counsel to those unable to afford it,
particularly the unconscionable caseloads that budget restraints force public
defenders to triage, has been extensively documented.126 But these
caseloads also affect—and are ultimately driven by—district attorney
offices. These offices must manage the explosion of arrests for petty crimes
in the “broken windows” era of policing, which targets ever more minor
offenses in the hopes of curtailing serious crime.127 In this context, doing
away with jail time and avoiding opposition may relieve significant
pressure on prosecutor offices to reduce their caseloads while bolstering
However, allowing prosecutors to leverage a
conviction rates.128
defendant’s right to counsel to manage their own caseloads perversely
places innocent defendants at grave risk of wrongful conviction. Indeed,
the Supreme Court recognized in Alabama v. Shelton129 that, having
shattered “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,” uncounseled
convictions are inherently less reliable.130
This dynamic tips even more decisively in favor of the prosecution given,
as the Supreme Court recognized five years ago in Missouri v. Frye131 and
Lafler v. Cooper,132 that our criminal justice system “is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials”;133 thus, “the negotiation of a plea
123. See Crane, supra note 99, at 794.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 800.
126. See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 115, at 20–24; see also STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR. ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 17–18 (2004), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_scl
aid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FE4U-DMDQ]; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50–
52, 65–70 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S6GN-RF3C].
127. King, supra note 99, at 17–20.
128. See id. at 20.
129. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
130. Id. at 666–67 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
131. 566 U.S. 133 (2012).
132. 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
133. Id. at 169.
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bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical
point for a defendant.”134 The Court estimated that guilty pleas account for
97 percent of federal and 94 percent of state convictions.135 Yet the
defendants in both Argersinger and Scott were convicted after trials before
a judge, and the Court clearly framed the actual incarceration standard as
addressing the rights of a defendant at trial, stating: “Under the rule we
announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor
starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits
it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”136
In all likelihood, the trial in most misdemeanor cases today will never
start, making the Court’s logic decidedly archaic. Instead of a court at least
retaining the potential to protect an uncounseled defendant from the worst
damage he might inflict on himself at trial, prosecutors are free to plea
bargain with the uncounseled without intervention.137 Left alone to
negotiate with the prosecutor, the defendant has no way of knowing that the
prosecutor’s seemingly generous offer of no jail time may prove ruinous.
Facing the prospect of pretrial detention, losing their jobs, or heavier
penalties after trial, innocent defendants may perceive they have no choice
except to take the plea.138 As with trials conducted without “the guiding
hand of counsel,” the plea-bargaining process becomes an additional source
of wrongful outcomes.139
Even if a defendant would have been willing to plead guilty with counsel,
the power imbalance created by Scott is troubling. As with Scott’s
hypothetical public defender, competent defense counsel could negotiate
more effectively with the prosecutor, including reaching a plea to an
alternative offense that might minimize or eliminate potential collateral
consequences.140 If the most damaging collateral consequences cannot be
avoided, counsel could also help the defendant evaluate whether the harm
of the collateral consequence, like deportation or the loss of public housing,
may be so severe that the defendant is better off simply taking his chances
at trial. For nonpetty offenses, counsel can help the defendant decide
whether to invoke the right to a jury trial. Thus, a defendant denied the
“guiding hand” of counsel at trial also suffers at other critical phases of his

134. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.
135. Id. at 143.
136. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
137. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 126, at 89 (“In several courts, the
Committee’s investigators found that defendants were encouraged to negotiate with
prosecutors without the assistance of counsel, and in one court they were required to do so.
These negotiations frequently involved a discussion of the charged offenses and led to guilty
pleas.”).
138. See Clapman, supra note 103, at 598.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 596 (noting that “prosecutors generally are more willing in [deportation]
cases to work out a plea that avoids deportation and the law affords more opportunities for
the parties to do so”).
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defense, including plea negotiations, that could protect him from crippling
collateral consequences.141
Scott also creates an imbalance between the uncounseled defendant and
the courts, in that the decision undervalues the direct consequences of a
criminal conviction. The Supreme Court justified the actual incarceration
standard in part on the premise that actual imprisonment was categorically
different from a mere fine.142 Though many commentators have argued
that the impact of collateral consequences warrants rethinking Scott, few
have examined how the extensive array of fines, fees, and costs that courts
may now impose upon conviction should affect that decision’s validity.
Alexandra Natapoff has observed that, “[a]s government budgets shrink
around the country, lower criminal courts are being reconceptualized and
repurposed as revenue sources.”143 States and localities are increasingly
imposing “user fees” on criminal defendants to generate this needed
revenue. For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that
prosecutors could petition the court to impose a prosecution fee on a
convicted defendant.144 Perhaps the most extreme example of this
phenomenon in recent memory comes from the city of Ferguson, Missouri.
Thrust into the national spotlight by the police shooting of unarmed black
teenager Michael Brown, the subsequent investigation by the Department of
Justice into the city’s municipal court system revealed that local judges
collected $2.46 million in fines and fees in 2013, or over 20 percent of the
town’s revenue.145 Around the country, a defendant convicted of a minor
offense may find himself charged for the costs of the police investigation,
probation supervision, jail stays, and court overhead.146
The amount of debt generated by a “legal financial obligation” (LFO) can
quickly overwhelm an indigent defendant. Failure to pay these LFOs
exacerbates the debt spiral by leading to additional fees and interest
charges,147 as well as ruining a debtor’s credit148 or leading to the
revocation of a driver’s license.149 And to collect this revenue, courts are
141. The absence of counsel may also disadvantage a defendant when it comes to making
arguments for release on bond or ensuring the record is properly preserved for appeal.
142. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
143. Natapoff, supra note 101, at 1099; see also Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson:
Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution and Constitutional Limitations 16 (St.
Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854372 (“Fines and related fees may
provide a better source of revenue than do property, sales and income taxes since the amount
of revenue from fines remains substantially within the municipality’s control.”)
[https://perma.cc/86H9-9NC5].
144. State v. Griffin, 180 So.3d 1262, 1273 (La. 2015).
145. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 9 (2015), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=95274 [https://perma.cc/92
CY-5Z3F].
146. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 4 (2010).
147. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary
Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 505, 517 (2011).
148. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 146, at 4.
149. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 147, at 517–18.
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growing increasingly aggressive,150 resorting to jailing debtors without
regard to clear Supreme Court precedent limiting these practices.151 The
result is that a supposedly minor “fine only” offense like Scott’s may still
ultimately result in incarceration for the unwitting defendant.152
Of course, LFOs may also ensnare a represented defendant. But the
inevitable result of denying counsel to defendants who do not face jail time
is to make it easier for jurisdictions to secure convictions.153 Indeed, the
Argersinger Court pointedly observed that, by one estimate, represented
defendants in certain courts were five times more likely to have their
charges dismissed than the unrepresented.154 Scott thus perversely allows
jurisdictions to maintain inflated conviction rates for minor offenses while
saving on the overhead costs of jail and defense counsel. They are then free
to focus on extracting money from defendants processed through this
system, often using the threat of jail. Understanding the pitfalls—whether
labeled direct or collateral—that unrepresented defendants face once the
state tags them as criminals reveals the central irony in Scott: despite the
Argersinger Court’s overriding concern with counsel’s role in preventing
assembly line justice, Scott allows states to operate their assembly lines at a
more brutal pace than ever.
II. POTENTIAL FIXES—AND THEIR FLAWS
Various authors have urged rejection of the actual incarceration standard
for appointing counsel under the Sixth Amendment.155 Like the Justices
who declined to join the main opinions in Argersinger and Scott, these
critics have emphasized that the standard bears no connection to the
seriousness of the offense, the complexity of the legal issues involved, or
the severity of the collateral consequences that may stem from such a
conviction.156
The most common proposal for a new Sixth Amendment standard is to
provide counsel for any individual facing a conviction.157 The position
relies primarily on the severity of collateral consequences for
misdemeanors. Second most common among the Scott fixes is to guarantee

150. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 36 (2015).
151. See Natapoff, supra note 101, at 1081–86.
152. Indeed, the Department of Justice recently admonished local court leaders around the
country that the spread of unlawful efforts by courts to collect criminal fees threatened to
“cast doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal and erode trust between local governments and
their constituents.” OFFICE FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETTER 2 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download [https://perma.cc/
D46M-SKGL].
153. See Natapoff, supra note 101, at 1078.
154. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
155. See, e.g., King, supra note 99, at 15; Murray, supra note 57, at 1170;.
156. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 97, at 73.
157. See Gross, supra note 97. See generally King, supra note 99.

2017]

KEEPING GIDEON’S PROMISE

2321

the right to counsel for those facing deportation, arguably the most severe
collateral consequence.158
All of these critiques rely, at least implicitly, on the premise that it is
fundamentally unfair for an uncounseled conviction to authorize a
debilitating collateral consequence. Under this view, not only are
uncounseled convictions less reliable by their very nature, but providing
counsel to the indigent defendant facing misdemeanor convictions is also
necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.159
The major impediment for these proponents is that the Supreme Court
has largely abandoned the principles of fundamental fairness animating
Gideon. Post-Gideon, the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has
focused heavily on the reliability of convictions, arguably to the exclusion
of other goals, and on the role of counsel in ensuring such reliability.160 In
that vein, the Court has narrowed the right to counsel inquiry for
misdemeanors to the question of whether uncounseled convictions are
adequately reliable for certain criminal justice outcomes. In the process, it
has endorsed the view that, because uncounseled convictions are not
inherently unreliable—even if they are categorically less reliable than
counseled convictions—they may support incarceration in subsequent
criminal proceedings.
To explain, in Nichols v. United States,161 the Court held that
uncounseled convictions obtained in accordance with Scott can be used to
enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction.162 In an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of Scott—the Court framed Nichols as
overturning its prior decision in Baldasar v. Illinois.163 There, the Court
issued a per curiam opinion holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction, even if valid under Scott, could not be used to elevate the level
of, and minimum sentence for, a subsequent offense.164 But the Baldasar
majority could not settle on a rationale for the opinion, with two separate
concurrences joined by five Justices. Justice Powell dissented with three
other Justices and argued that a valid conviction could be used to enhance a
subsequent sentence.165
Nichols involved a defendant whose uncounseled prior conviction
contributed three criminal history points to raise his offense level one
category under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for a drug charge.166

158. See, e.g., Clapman, supra note 103, at 598.
159. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (explaining that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice requires “not that a trial be fair, but that a
particular guarantee of fairness be provided”).
160. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring, to prove
that counsel’s conduct was ineffective, a “showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”).
161. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
162. Id. at 746–47.
163. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting).
166. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740.
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Subsequently, the judge sentenced Nichols to a maximum term of 235
months, 25 more months than the prescribed maximum term had the prior
conviction been excluded.167 The Court, invoking Justice Powell’s dissent
in Baldasar, determined that, although Nichols’s uncounseled conviction
resulted in a higher sentence for the subsequent offense, Nichols was only
punished for the subsequent offense.168 Relying on the “less exacting”
nature of the sentencing process, the Court additionally noted that the
sentencing court could have considered Nichols’s alleged criminal conduct
as a sentencing factor even if there had been no conviction.169 Because the
state only had to prove such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, “it
must be constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction based on the same conduct where that conduct
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”170 The Court went on to reject
the notion that the defendant should at least be warned that an uncounseled
conviction might enhance a later sentence because the local courts
responsible for most uncounseled convictions do not keep records of the
proceedings to memorialize the warning.171
Concurring with the judgment, Justice David Souter revealed the
majority’s sleight of hand in “overruling” Baldasar.172 Deeming that
decision too splintered to overrule, Justice Souter instead began with
Argersinger’s sustaining premise “that the concern over reliability raised by
the absence of counsel is tolerable when a defendant does not face the
deprivation of his liberty.”173 For Justice Souter, Argersinger raised serious
doubts about whether a defendant could permissibly receive an enhanced
sentence based solely on an uncounseled and unreliable prior conviction.174
But, as Justice Souter noted, Nichols did not raise that issue. Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Nichols’s sentencing judge could have
departed from the recommended sentencing range if she had concerns about
the reliability of Nichols’s prior conviction.175 Justice Souter concluded
that “[w]here concern for reliability is accommodated, as it is under the
Guidelines, nothing in the Sixth Amendment or our cases requires a
sentencing court to ignore the fact of a valid uncounseled conviction, even
if that conviction is a less confident indicator of guilt than a counseled one
would be.”176 By contrast, where an uncounseled conviction automatically
enhances the statutory penalty for a subsequent charge—and thus must be
considered a substantive element of that new offense under the Sixth
Amendment rather than a mere sentencing factor177—a sentencing judge is
167. See id. at 741.
168. Id. at 747.
169. Id. at 746–47. This is no longer true for facts that raise the mandatory minimum
sentence. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163–64 (2013).
170. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 749.
173. Id. at 750 (Souter, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 750–51.
175. Id. at 751–52.
176. Id. at 753.
177. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013).
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powerless to mitigate the sentencing range based on concerns about the
reliability of the prior uncounseled conviction.
Despite Justice Souter’s protestations, the Court has not abandoned
Nichols. Nor has it abandoned its myopic insistence on reliability as the
touchstone of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
This past Term, a unanimous Court in United States v. Bryant178 reaffirmed
that valid convictions under Scott can serve as the basis for any sentencing
enhancement.179 Bryant adds a twist to Nichols because the defendant in
Bryant received jail time on the uncounseled convictions that automatically
enhanced, and, indeed, provided the entire basis for, his subsequent federal
conviction. Specifically, Bryant was convicted in federal court of
“domestic assault in Indian country by a habitual offender” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 117(a).180 The statute imposes a maximum five-year sentence on anyone
with at least two prior domestic violence convictions in state, federal, or
Indian tribal courts. Bryant’s predicate convictions were all in tribal court,
and they were all uncounseled.181 For most of those uncounseled
convictions, Bryant served jail terms of less than a year.182 Had Bryant’s
prior convictions been in federal court, they would have violated the Sixth
Amendment and could not have supported conviction under a recidivist
statute.183 “But,” the Court pointedly noted, “the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to tribal-court proceedings,” and, under the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, only those sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment are
entitled to counsel.184
Bryant nonetheless argued that his uncounseled convictions, though
technically not in violation of the Sixth Amendment, still implicated the
reliability concerns supporting the right to counsel in criminal cases.185 The
Court was unpersuaded. Seemingly conceding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel hinges on concerns about reliability, the Court asserted that
Scott and Nichols still preclude any notion that uncounseled convictions are
“categorically unreliable.”186 The Court bolstered this position by pointing
out that Bryant had admitted he would have no claim for relief had he
received only fines in the prior proceedings because those convictions
would certainly be valid under Scott in any U.S. court.187 The Court went
on to emphasize that the reliability of tribal proceedings do not turn on “the
sanction—fine only or a year in prison—ultimately imposed.”188
Of course the reliability of the proceedings cannot be gauged solely by
the result of those proceedings. But herein lies the means by which the
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

135 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
Id. at 1966.
Id. at 1956.
See id. at 1957.
See id. at 1962.
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 111 (1967).
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958.
See id. at 1966.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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Court has both enlarged and distorted the role of reliability under the Sixth
Amendment. While the Court has acknowledged counsel’s role in ensuring
reliability and that reliability cannot be assessed based on the sanction
imposed, the sanction imposed remains the metric by which counsel is
deemed necessary.
Indeed, the Argersinger Court recognized the
incoherence of such logic when it determined that counsel may be
necessary in some petty offense cases because it doubted that the “legal and
constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a
person can be sent off for six months or more.”189 It is easy enough to say
that the potential consequences of a proceeding indicate little about the
proceeding itself. What is left unclear is how one can make a principled
decision that the proceeding is reliable enough to impose collateral
consequences but not time in prison. Nonetheless, this is the distinction not
only endorsed in Nichols and Bryant but that arguably has its roots in
Argersinger and Scott. Although reliability is not explicitly discussed in
Scott, and the Court’s stated rationale is sparse, notions of reliability likely
explain the Court’s willingness to allow uncounseled convictions so long as
they do not result in “so severe a sanction” as incarceration.190
The Nichols and Bryant Courts’ endorsement of the idea that
uncounseled convictions are sufficiently reliable for use in subsequent
criminal proceedings creates a conundrum for those advancing a new Sixth
Amendment standard based on the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions. Bryant deems an uncounseled misdemeanor valid enough to
serve as an element of a subsequent offense that results in incarceration.
Moreover, the Court has held the line for nearly four decades on the notion
that incarceration is a penalty different in kind from any other. Without a
fundamental reexamination of these positions, or of the foundational values
underpinning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is difficult to
imagine the Court holding that the same conviction, which might later serve
as a predicate to actual incarceration, could not provide the basis for a
collateral consequence.
Even if such a reexamination occurred and the Court expanded the right
to counsel, concerns regarding its implementation would remain. Many
indigent defendants already do not receive counsel even when they are
legally entitled to it under current Sixth Amendment doctrine.191 A 2004
report by the American Bar Association revealed that many indigent
defendants are never provided counsel and that the problem is exacerbated

189. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
190. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979); see also Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738, 750 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining the line drawn in Scott between
“imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties” as based “on the theory, as I understand it, that
the concern over reliability raised by the absence of counsel is tolerable when a defendant
does not face the deprivation of his liberty”).
191. See Natapoff, supra note 57, at 1328–29; see also THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
supra note 126, at 84–86.
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in misdemeanor cases.192 A report by the National Right to Counsel
Committee in 2009 stated that in “misdemeanor courts across the
country . . . counsel is oftentimes either not provided, or provided late, to
those who are lawfully eligible to be represented.”193 Whether caused by
limited resources, apathy toward the accused, or ignorance of constitutional
requirements, the failure of misdemeanor courts to meet current indigent
defense needs suggests that expanding the right will confront myriad
difficulties. However, rather than approach the problem as a zero-sum
game,194 where meaningful expansion of the right to counsel is contingent
upon jurisdictions increasing their fiscal or ideological commitments, we
suggest in Part III that reducing the number of criminal cases requiring
counsel may avoid more difficult questions about how to provide more
public defenders for misdemeanor defendants.
In considering the feasibility of an expanded right to counsel, it is worth
noting that most states have rejected Scott and extended the right to courtappointed counsel beyond Scott’s requirements. As of 2013, five states
(California,195 Delaware,196 Indiana,197 New York,198 and Oklahoma199)

192. See Natapoff, supra note 57, at 1328–29; see also STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID
DEFENDANTS, supra note 126, at 22–23 (2004); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
supra note 126, at 84–86.
193. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 126, at 85.
194. Erica Hashimoto suggests based on empirical evidence in federal court that “the
value added by counsel in less serious misdemeanor cases is far lower than the value added
in more serious cases.” Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 466 (2007). Hashimoto contends that counsel is sometimes
unnecessarily appointed in low-level misdemeanor cases as an alternative to determining the
sentence at the beginning of the case (as demanded under Sixth Amendment doctrine). Id.
Working from the assumption that attorneys often add less value in the context of
misdemeanor representation than in the context of more serious criminal cases, Hashimoto
suggests a multipronged approach that would curtail the appointment of counsel in such
cases, thus freeing up resources for more effective representation in felony cases. See id. at
461. She suggests that states should (1) amend overbroad appointment statutes to align with
the federal constitutional standard, (2) amend probation statutes so that probation is not
enforced through imprisonment, (3) reduce penalties for minor offenses, and (4) require a
determination of the sentence at the outset of the proceeding in misdemeanor cases. Id.
While her solution is a pragmatic one, it is constructed based on the assumption that the
number of cases within the system is fixed; here, we suggest that assumption is one that
should be challenged.
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (West 2013); see also Mills v. Mun. Court, 515 P.2d 273,
287 (Cal. 1973) (requiring counsel or an adequate record of waiver for all misdemeanors).
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602 (2003) (providing a right to counsel to any “indigent
person who is under arrest or charged with a crime”).
197. Brunson v. State, 394 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (interpreting the Indiana
constitution to guarantee “right to counsel for all persons charged with a criminal
misdemeanor, regardless of whether the charge ultimately results in . . . imprisonment”);
Frazier v. State, 391 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (“[T]he Indiana Constitution
makes no distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, the right to counsel must and does
exist in misdemeanor cases to the same extent and under the same rules as it exists in felony
cases.”).
198. People v. Ross, 493 N.E.2d 917, 920 (N.Y. 1986) (“[T]he [New York] Criminal
Procedure Law clearly provides broad statutory protection to all defendants accused of
felonies and misdemeanors without reference to the potential sentence attached to the
crime.”).
AND INDIGENT
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recognized the right to counsel in all misdemeanor cases, four states
(Alaska,200 Minnesota,201 North Carolina,202 and Vermont203) recognized
the right to counsel if the potential fine is sufficiently high, twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia recognized the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases if incarceration is possible,204 three states (Missouri,205
North Carolina,206 and Pennsylvania207) recognized the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases if incarceration is probable, and two states (Nevada208
199. Swanegan v. State, 743 P.2d 131, 132 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (“An accused has the
unconditional and absolute right to counsel in any felony or misdemeanor proceeding.”). But
see id. (“We require the full panoply of constitutional rights when liberty interests are
threatened.”).
200. Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971) (“[W]e here
define the term ‘criminal prosecution,’ as it relates to the right to have the assistance of
counsel, as including any offense a direct penalty for which may be incarceration in a jail or
penal institution, which may result in the loss of a valuable license, or which may result in a
heavy enough fine to indicate criminality.”).
201. City of Minneapolis v. Wentworth, 269 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1978) (holding, in
deciding whether defendant should have been advised of his right to counsel, “defendants
should be advised of their right to seek legal assistance where, as here, the potential penalty
for municipal ordinance violations, though non-incarcerative, involves serious economic
hardship”).
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1) (2005) (providing a right to counsel in any case in
which a fine of $500 or more is “likely to be adjudged”).
203. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5201(4)(B) (2016) (defining “serious crime” to include
misdemeanors with a fine of $1,000 or more); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321 (Vt.
1991) (applying VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5201(4)(B)). But see State v. Porter, 671 A.2d
1280, 1282 (Vt. 1996) (“[W]e have consistently held that the right to representation by
counsel found in Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution confers a right similar to
the federal Sixth Amendment right.”).
204. This includes Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Memorandum from Susan David Demaine & Jessica K. Dickinson to Professor Norman
Lefstein, 50-State Survey: Right of Counsel for Misdemeanants (Dec. 17, 2013) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
205. State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 606 (Mo.
2012) (“Upon a showing of indigency, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint counsel to
represent a person charged with an offense likely to result in imprisonment.” (quoting MO.
SUPP. CT. R. 31.02(a))).
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451 (“An indigent person is entitled to services of counsel in
the following actions and proceedings: (1) Any case in which imprisonment, or a fine of
five hundred dollars ($500.00), or more, is likely to be adjudged . . . .”); State v. Neeley, 297
S.E.2d 389, 393 (N.C. 1982) (“If a trial judge is prepared to impose an active prison sentence
on an indigent defendant he must be sure that defendant is afforded appointed counsel. If an
indigent defendant is not afforded appointed counsel he may not be given an active prison
sentence.”).
207. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (c) (West 2013) (“An offense defined by
this title constitutes a summary offense if . . . (2) if a person convicted thereof may be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more than 90 days.”);
PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(a) (“Counsel shall be appointed: (1) in all summary cases, for all
defendants who are without financial resources or who are otherwise unable to employ
counsel when there is a likelihood that imprisonment will be imposed; (2) in all court cases,
prior to the preliminary hearing to all defendants who are without financial resources or who
are otherwise unable to employ counsel.” (emphasis added)).
208. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.397 (West 2011) (“Every defendant accused of a gross
misdemeanor or felony who is financially unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel
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and South Dakota209) recognized a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases
where incarceration for more than six months is possible (i.e., where a
defendant also has a federal right to a jury).
While these exceptions demonstrate that extending the right to counsel
beyond Scott is not per se impractical, they also suggest that it will be
difficult to identify a uniform replacement for the actual incarceration
standard that is fully satisfying. For example, North Carolina law provides
for the appointment of counsel when imprisonment or a fine of $500 or
more is “likely to be adjudged.”210 In Vermont, indigent criminal
defendants are entitled to a court-appointed lawyer for offenses with a
sentence of imprisonment upon conviction or carrying a fine in excess of
$1,000.211 And Alaska has interpreted its own state constitution to provide
for a right to the assistance of counsel for offenses that may result in
incarceration or “the loss of a valuable license, or which may result in a
heavy enough fine to indicate criminality.”212 These state laws are arguably
an improvement upon the Argersinger-Scott rule from the standpoint of
defendants who benefit. Yet they still exclude many defendants also
greatly in need of counsel who may be denied a lawyer based on their
financial status. Further, they remain based on the potential punishments
attached to a criminal conviction, which Argersinger and Bryant confirm
bears little relationship to the complexity of the underlying case. Though
some amount of arbitrariness is a natural consequence of line drawing, the
issue is whether that line drawing comports with the ideals of fundamental
fairness and equal access championed in Gideon, especially where the
conviction itself, rather than the fine or potential sentence authorized by the
conviction, is often the most damaging outcome of a criminal prosecution.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION: AN ALTERNATIVE PATH
In this part, we contend that viewing the right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases not from a Sixth Amendment perspective but instead from the vantage
point of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses and the right of meaningful access to the courts provides a superior
assigned.”); id. § 193.140 (“Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 364 days, or by a fine of not
more than $2,000, or by both fine and imprisonment.”).
209. In re Wright, 189 N.W.2d 447, 449–50 (S.D. 1971) (“The petty-offense rule now has
Congressional approval. 18 U.S.C.A. 3006A. That provision denies to defendants in federal
prosecutions the right to appointed counsel if their offense is petty, which is defined therein
as any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment of six months or a
fine of not more than $500 or both. Until the United States Supreme Court decides the issue
presented otherwise, we hold that the applicant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel
by virtue of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That provision, in
our view, does not extend the right to offenses of this type. . . . The provision of the South
Dakota Constitution on which [defendant] relies is Art. VI, § 7. It is substantially like the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1).
211. State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 323 (Vt. 1991).
212. Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971) (interpreting
article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution).
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framework to resolve the dilemmas described above. While the Supreme
Court has made clear the limitations of the Sixth Amendment as applied to
misdemeanor defendants, those defendants are still entitled to meaningful
access to the courts by cases like Gideon and Griffin v. Illinois,213 described
in Part III.A below. That right suggests that the denial of counsel to
misdemeanor defendants—particularly those facing a host of severe
collateral consequences—may not raise any Sixth Amendment issues yet
may still run counter to the right of meaningful access.
The primary difference between these two areas of constitutional law lies
in the type of line drawing that is permissible under each approach. Unless
the Sixth Amendment requires counsel for all criminal defendants, some
line drawing between those entitled to counsel and those who are not is
inevitable. Erica Hashimoto asserts that the actual incarceration line drawn
in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton is defensible because it provides states
with “distinct options for complying with the constitutional requirement”
and permits jurisdictions to focus on providing, rather than denying,
representation.214 While many have critiqued the standard’s reliance on
incarceration, she emphasizes that, by doing so, it offers states “a low-cost
way to comply with the Constitution: eliminate incarceration and probated
sentences for low-level offenders.”215 But, even framed as an economic
matter, we must still ask: What costs does the Constitution require states to
pay and, consequently, which defendants does it allow states to leave
behind?216
Hashimoto presents the two possible routes for avoiding a Sixth
Amendment violation under the Argersinger-Scott-Shelton line of cases as
equal:
a risk-averse legislature can either appoint counsel in all
misdemeanor cases where there is a possibility of incarceration or it can
remove the possibility of incarceration altogether (meaning that the
defendants in such cases are not entitled to counsel). Both solutions are
equally effective in avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation. However,
neither adequately accounts for the range of consequences that result from
conviction, or even the charge, because those factors are irrelevant to the
Sixth Amendment analysis. As explained below, from the perspective of
ensuring meaningful access to the courts, both solutions are deeply flawed.
Moreover, in those jurisdictions that have chosen neither one of those
two extremes, but instead leave discretion to the judge or the prosecutor to
determine whether a defendant’s sentence will involve incarceration, the
equal protection problems are even more troubling. In such a jurisdiction,
two defendants may be deemed indigent and charged with the same offense,
213. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
214. Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1019, 1041 (2013).
215. Id. at 1042.
216. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 62 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“If I
were satisfied that the guarantee of due process required the assistance of counsel in every
case in which a jail sentence is imposed or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority’s rule, I would not hesitate to join the Court’s opinion despite my
misgivings as to its effect upon the administration of justice.”).
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yet only one will be denied counsel because of a discretionary decision in
that defendant’s case. Still another defendant, who has not been deemed
indigent and thus can afford to retain counsel regardless of the
determination made with regard to incarceration, is almost never subject to
revocation of his Sixth Amendment right.
The Court’s focus on reliability under its Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence and its adherence to the view that uncounseled convictions
are reliable enough to support certain direct and collateral criminal penalties
allow constitutional compliance to turn on the cost the state is willing to
bear to seek certain ends. While Scott held that uncounseled convictions
cannot result in incarceration, those convictions can be used to impose fines
and other collateral consequences.217 As a result, states are free to pursue
convictions in all cases and can accommodate the level of representation
they are able or willing to provide simply by deciding not to seek jail time
in certain cases.
Framed instead as a question of equal access to the courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant inquiry shifts from “what costs we are
willing to impose to secure certain convictions” to “whether those accused
of crimes have access to a meaningful defense.” With a focus on process
first and outcomes second, states could no longer rely on actual
incarceration as a valve to relieve pressure on their indigent defense
systems. Imposing this higher constitutional floor would require states to
provide effective counsel to all defendants instead of drawing a line
between groups of defendants. The resulting costs would likely require that
states take some cases out of the criminal system altogether to ensure that
those cases that remain do not run afoul of equal protection. In other
words, even if we maintain a pragmatic understanding of limited resources,
we need not lessen the state’s obligation to provide effective counsel to all
defendants if we can reduce the number of cases in which that obligation
applies.
Therefore, rather than focus on the likelihood or feasibility of a Sixth
Amendment-driven remedy, we recommend that—in the spirit of Justice
Brennan’s and Justice Powell’s opinions in Argersinger and Scott218—those
seeking reform look instead to equal protection and the right of meaningful
access to the courts.
A. Equal Protection and Access to the Courts
While not recently deployed by the Court in its right to counsel cases,219
there is a robust body of jurisprudence historically linking access to the
217. See supra Part I.B.
218. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 63 n.31 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It seems to me that
such an individualized rule, unlike a six-month rule and the majority’s rule, does not present
equal protection problems under this Court’s decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); and Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.
189 (1971).”).
219. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1220 (noting that the Court’s recent right to effective
counsel jurisprudence has relied exclusively on the Sixth Amendment).
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courts and equal protection. The Court first expressed concern about
indigent defendants’ ability to access the courts in Powell v. Alabama.220
Holding that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in capital
cases, the Powell Court relied primarily on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.221 While it did not rely explicitly on the Equal
Protection Clause, the opinion did emphasize “the inequitable treatment of
indigents in criminal proceedings” and a “general concern about indigents’
ability to participate in the judicial process.”222 Animating the Powell
Court (and, subsequently, the Gideon Court) was the understanding that a
layperson, without legal training, would be unable to effectively navigate
the judicial system:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.223

Gideon is well known as the case establishing that indigent defendants
have a right to court-appointed counsel in state criminal cases.224 Primarily
recognized as a Sixth Amendment case, Gideon also relied on equal
protection principles, noting safeguards must be in place to ensure that
“every defendant stands equal before the law.”225 As originally understood,
the Sixth Amendment protected only the right to retain or employ volunteer
counsel.226 The transition from that negative interpretation to a more
affirmative understanding of the right, made complete by Gideon, was
necessarily driven by the desire to equalize access.
Less than a decade before Gideon, the Court relied more explicitly on
equal protection in Griffin, holding that because of its importance to
meaningful appellate review, a trial transcript could not be withheld from a
criminal defendant based on his inability to pay the cost of such a
transcript.227 Similarly, in Douglas v. California,228 decided the same day
220. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
221. Id. at 71–72.
222. Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221.
223. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69. This is also quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344–45 (1963).
224. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
225. Id.
226. See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891).
227. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13–14, 16, 19 (1956) (“Destitute defendants must be
afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts.”).
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as Gideon, the Court held that the government must provide indigent
defendants with counsel on appeal.229 Treading outside of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantees, the Douglas Court relied on equal protection
principles, stating:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshaling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, where the record is unclear
or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while
the rich man has a meaningful appeal.230

Griffin, Gideon, Douglas, and the cases that followed might therefore be
viewed as establishing two key principles in access to courts jurisprudence:
(1) a defendant’s relative (or lack of) wealth should not determine his or her
treatment by the court and (2) indigent defendants are entitled to as
meaningful a review as defendants of financial means.231 In subsequent
cases, like Entsminger v. Iowa,232 Mayer v. Chicago,233 and Britt v. North
Carolina,234 the Court continued to emphasize this point, holding that “the
Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in
equal scale”235 and that indigent prisoners must be provided “with the basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a
price to other prisoners.”236 As one commentator has noted, the primary
rationale for the Court’s decision in Mayer, holding that indigent defendants
cannot be required to pay costs to appeal a misdemeanor conviction (even
when the defendant has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration), was
that “imposing costs upon indigents as a condition of appeal constitutes
invidious discrimination, regardless of the interest at stake’s gravity.”237
In Mayer, the state attempted to distinguish the case at hand from those
in which the defendant was imprisoned, an argument the Court soundly
rejected:
Where the accused, as here, is not subject to imprisonment, but only a
fine, the city suggests that his interest in a transcript is outweighed by the
State’s fiscal and other interests in not burdening the appellate process.
This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin no less than does the
228. 372 U.S. 353 (1983).
229. Id. at 357–58.
230. Id.
231. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1224.
232. 386 U.S. 748 (1967).
233. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
234. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
235. Entsminger, 386 U.S. at 752.
236. Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.
237. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right of Poor People to Appeal Without
Payment of Fees: Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 450 (1999); see also Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196 (“The size of the
defendant’s pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony
than in a felony case. The distinction drawn by Rule 607(b) is, therefore, an ‘unreasoned
distinction’ proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305, 310 (1966))).
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line that Rule 607(b) expressly draws. Griffin does not represent a
balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society; its
principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as
effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own
way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal
procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by
any differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State’s fiscal
interest is, therefore, irrelevant.238

The Mayer Court went on to observe:
The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the kind
involved here are not to be minimized. A fine may bear as heavily on an
indigent accused as forced confinement. The collateral consequences of
conviction may be even more serious, as when (as was apparently a
possibility in this case) the impecunious medical student finds himself
barred from the practice of medicine because of a conviction he is unable
to appeal for lack of funds. Moreover, the State’s long-term interest
would not appear to lie in making access to appellate processes from even
its most inferior courts depend upon the defendant’s ability to pay.239

It would seem anomalous or inconsistent, then, to conclude that even
though equal protection precludes a state court from denying an indigent
misdemeanant access to the record necessary for an adequate appeal240—
even when that defendant is not facing incarceration—the same court would
be free to deny that defendant (before he is deemed guilty) access to a
lawyer to provide her with a meaningful adjudication.
The access to courts line of cases makes clear that, in the context of this
fundamental right, individuals cannot be treated differently on the basis of
wealth. From that perspective, the problem with the Argersinger-Scott
formulation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is that indigent
defendants may not have access to counsel in cases where a meaningful
defense is important or needed. It exacerbates this inequality by
empowering the prosecutor and the judge to divest the defendant of the
right to meaningful access. It is telling that five Justices on the Scott Court
at some point recognized or foreshadowed the equal protection problems
posed by the actual incarceration standard: Justices Powell and Rehnquist
in Argersinger241 and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in Scott.242
238. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196–97.
239. Id. at 197.
240. See id. at 198 (“We conclude that appellant cannot be denied a ‘record of sufficient
completeness’ to permit proper consideration of his claims.”).
241. Although the problems identified in some opinions related to the distinction based on
incarceration rather than the one based on wealth, the two are related. Those who can afford
to hire private counsel are not subject to the variances in protection that come about as a
result of the Court’s incarceration-based standard. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
54 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The new rule announced today also could result in equal
protection problems. There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual
defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has determined in advance to leave
open the option of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled in some
courts to counsel while in other courts in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the
same offense would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel may be essential to a fair
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As predicted, indigent defendants facing misdemeanor charges today
experience a different criminal justice system than their wealthier cohorts.
B. Equal Protection and the Right to a Lawyer
in Misdemeanor Cases
As described above, there are two lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence
applicable to indigent misdemeanor defendants seeking representation in
state court. The first, from the Argersinger-Scott line of cases under the
Sixth Amendment, offers them only selective protection—if they cannot
afford a lawyer, they are only entitled to one if they are incarcerated upon
conviction. The second, from Griffin, Douglas, and the subsequent cases
discussed, suggests due process and equal protection require that, regardless
of what is at stake, defendants without financial means cannot be deprived
of elements of an adequate or meaningful defense to which those with
means would have access.243 Interwoven among the latter group of cases is
the recognition that while the consequences of such deprivation may range
in severity—from a fine or loss of a license to incarceration—even the least
severe of consequences should not turn on the ability to pay. Together,
these cases suggest that states cannot operate a dual criminal justice system
for which the assignment to one track or the other turns on a defendant’s
wealth. If the concern about such inequality is not limited to the
individual’s entitlement to a lawyer but also extends to the fact that poor
and wealthier defendants are being treated differently with respect to basic
procedural protections, the equal access to justice framework may provide a
better metric for evaluating indigent defense systems than the Sixth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court has generally tolerated discrimination based on
wealth, applying only rational basis review.244 Even so, it has specifically
recognized an exception—encompassing cases like Griffin and Douglas—
where defendants are “completely unable to pay for some desired benefit,
and as a consequence, they sustain[] an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”245 In Bearden v. Georgia,246
trial even in cases in which no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of pretrial
judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.”).
242. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
‘authorized imprisonment’ test presents no problems of administration. It avoids the
necessity for time-consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case
before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and
apparent and actual bias. These problems with the ‘actual imprisonment’ standard were
suggested in my Brother Powell’s concurrence in Argersinger, which was echoed in
scholarly criticism of that decision.” (citation omitted)).
243. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1229–30 (describing right to a meaningful defense).
244. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
245. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20 (discussing Griffin and Douglas as examples). The
Rodriguez Court also took note of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), in which the Court struck down criminal penalties subjecting
defendants to incarceration based solely on their inability to pay a fine. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 21–22.
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relying on previous precedents such as Williams v. Illinois247 and Tate v.
Short,248 the Court held that indigent defendants may not be incarcerated
based solely on the inability to pay a fine.249 Thus, there is a compelling
and deep line of precedent standing for the principle that poor defendants
cannot be deprived of a meaningful defense simply because they cannot
afford to hire an attorney.
Although not as apparent among more recent right to counsel cases,
equal protection—and, more specifically, the notion that treatment of those
in the criminal justice system should not be dependent on the ability to
pay—is resurging. Money bail practices have come under fire from the
courts for their ability to incarcerate only those who are unable to post
bond.250 Similarly, some have successfully attacked the overuse of fines
and fees as a means for incarcerating the poor.251
A stark example of equal protection’s value in this context can be found
in state court in Miami, Florida. Under Florida law, indigent defendants
charged with an offense punishable by incarceration are entitled to counsel
unless the court enters an Order of No Incarceration (ONI) at least fifteen

246. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
247. 399 U.S. 235 (1970); see also id. at 241–42 (“[O]nce the State has defined the outer
limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not
then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the
statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency.”).
248. 401 U.S. 395 (1971); see also id. at 398 (“[T]he same constitutional defect
condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate
payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or
not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a
person willing and able to pay a fine.” (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509
(1970))).
249. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73 (holding that “[s]uch a deprivation would be contrary
to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
250. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Thompson v. Moss
Point, No. 1:15cv182LG-RHW, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Jones v.
City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015);
Cooper v. City of Dothan, No. 1:15-cv-425-WKW, 2015 WL 10013003 (M.D. Ala. June 18,
2015); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo.
June 3, 2015); State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959, 968 (Ala. 1994); Lee v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d
1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (recognizing the right
to an individualized bail determination); Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 48,
Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (“[K]eeping
individuals in jail solely because they cannot pay for their release, whether via fines, fees, or
a cash bond, is impermissible.”); Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Jones v. City
of Clanton, No. 2:15-CV-00034-MHT-WC, 2015 WL 5387219 (Feb. 13, 2015), ECF No. 26
(stating that the use of secured bail to detain the indigent “not only violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but also constitutes bad public policy”).
251. See, e.g., Declaratory Judgment, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-00732-TSLRHW, 2016 WL 6405833 (S.D. Miss. June 20, 2016); Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv253, 2015 WL 510270 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, No.
2:13CV732-MHT, 2014 WL 6461900 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014); Mitchell v. City of
Montgomery, No. 2:14CV186-MHT, 2014 WL 11099432 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014); see
also Settlement Agreement, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-348-HSO-JCG (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 7, 2016); Complaint, Edwards v. Red Hills Cmty. Prob., No. 1:15-cv-67 (M.D.
Ga Apr. 10, 2015).
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days before trial.252 This system, consistent with the Argersinger-Scott line
of cases, effectively grants Miami prosecutors control over the right to
counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants. Prosecutors routinely seek
and obtain ONIs from the courts to remove the public defender. And when
the judge enters such an order, the defendant is no longer entitled to the
appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Many judges grant
ONIs without any independent review of the case or review of whether
removing counsel would substantially disadvantage the defendant, as
required under Florida law.253 In this way, defendants are frequently
stripped of public defenders that have spent weeks, even months, preparing
a case.254 This tactic provides prosecutors an enormous advantage over a
defendant, who, having proclaimed his innocence throughout the
proceedings, must now confront the State alone. Unlike Scott, whose
decision to challenge his fate resulted in a Supreme Court decision, many
defendants simply give up and take a plea bargain.255
The defendants convicted under this system often face fates worse than
jail. They may be deported. They may lose their homes. They may lose
their jobs. And they may suffer all of these hardships without any warning
that accepting a seemingly generous plea offer could ruin their lives or
livelihoods. Yet, under the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, they
have all been treated fairly. After all, their convictions are “reliable”
enough to justify the devastation that follows. By contrast, this practice
could not stand under an equal protection or due process analysis. The
Miami system essentially prices people out of their right to a fair
adjudication. Whatever one thinks about the reliability of convictions
resulting from this system, it offends the notions of equal dignity and due
process that we seek to elevate.
To be clear about the equal protection concern animating this Article, we
are concerned primarily with distinctions based on wealth given the Court’s
recognition that a criminal defendant’s access to the courts cannot turn on
his or her relative means. While there is another potential equal protection
distinction to be made between those defendants sentenced to incarceration
and those who are not—a concern animating positions like Justice Powell’s
concurrence in Argersinger—that is not our focus. We acknowledge that
252. See FLA. R. CRIM. P § 3.111(b).
253. See id.
254. The public defenders challenging this practice in state court have alleged that Florida
has created, in effect, two rights to counsel—one for indigent defendants, which is
revocable, and one for nonindigent defendants, which is more permanent. While the
Supreme Court has never deemed wealth to be a suspect classification demanding
heightened scrutiny, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
when a fundamental right—such as the right to counsel—is involved, strict scrutiny applies.
Thus, the burden would be on the state to put forth a compelling purpose for which such
unequal treatment could be deemed necessary; fiscal savings and administrative convenience
would not meet this threshold.
255. Public defenders have challenged this practice, relying on the equal protection
provisions of both the federal and Florida Constitutions. See Template for Motion Filed by
Public Defenders Office of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in Miami, Florida (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
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whether a defendant has meaningful access to the courts is not wholly
divorced from consequences: what is necessary to provide meaningful
access may look quite different for a defendant facing the death penalty
than for a defendant facing a light fine. The difference is that meaningful
access is not principally about outcomes. It is more fundamentally about
the fairness of the process by which those outcomes are determined and
whether that process is fair for all.256 It is unlikely that these fairness and
equality concerns can be accommodated by a distinction based strictly on
the sentence ultimately imposed.
Also, as described immediately above, these two equal protection
arguments—based on wealth and incarceration—are often connected. It is
only those defendants who cannot afford to hire an attorney whose access to
counsel (and thus meaningful access to the courts) is subject to control by
the prosecutor or the judge—should one of those parties choose to eliminate
incarceration as an option, a defendant will no longer be entitled to counsel.
This is why we argue that under the existing system, the most effective way
to satisfy equal protection is to ensure that all defendants charged with
criminal offenses are afforded meaningful access, which includes the
assistance of counsel. As described in Part III.C, this approach does not
necessarily require the appointment of counsel in every criminal case—at
least not in all cases currently defined as criminal. A better approach would
be to assess which offenses truly warrant the appointment of counsel to
guarantee meaningful access. We ultimately conclude that the full
decriminalization of certain lower-level offenses where counsel is required
by the access to courts line of cases but economically prohibitive is both the
most pragmatic and constitutionally sound solution to the pernicious
problem of assembly line justice in misdemeanor courts.
C. Toward an Equal-Protection-Driven Solution
As described above, from the perspective of equal access to courts, the
right to counsel analysis shifts from whether the criminal trial results in
incarceration to whether counsel is necessary for the individual to mount a
meaningful defense to the conviction itself. Understood this way,
guaranteeing meaningful access in practice would require a two-step
process. The first step would be to recognize that, for the reasons described
above, counsel is constitutionally required in all misdemeanor cases, or at
least for those defendants for whom significant consequences beyond
incarceration are at stake. As noted above, however, most indigent defense
systems are already delinquent in providing effective assistance of counsel;
expanding the number of cases in which counsel must be provided would
likely exacerbate these deficiencies.257 As John King has explained, the

256. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221 (noting the Gideon Court’s emphasis on both
substantive and procedural fairness).
257. See Hashimoto, supra note 194, at 513 (noting that, in a world of limited resources,
states that choose to provide representation to all indigent defendants will provide only
“minimal” representation); Natapoff, supra note 57, at 160 (“[T]he legal system already
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“mere presence of defense counsel . . . will not . . . solve the problem.”258
In misdemeanor courts across the county, even where counsel is provided,
the attorneys assigned to such cases are “overworked, under-experienced,
and often incompetent”; they often lack adequate time to see their clients or
prepare their cases and fail to conduct adequate investigations, undertake
required research, or file appropriate motions.259 These deficiencies are
overwhelmingly the result of systemic failures, such as underfunding, rather
than the fault of individual attorneys.260
To mitigate these difficulties, the second step would require
decriminalization of “petty” or low-level offenses261: once certain offenses
are no longer criminal, the need for counsel disappears.262 Though drawing
any line will always demarcate the haves from the have-nots, setting the
line between those who are charged with criminal offenses and those who
are not is more defensible than one based on incarceration, given the
significant direct and collateral costs of conviction. More importantly, such
a line guarantees equal treatment for all criminal defendants, and
decriminalization offers a way for states to meet the capacity demands
generated by that line.263 Rather than focusing strictly on the “supply side”
of the representation equation (i.e., the number of lawyers necessary to
defend those without means), states should also consider the “demand
side,” lessening the number of cases for which a lawyer is required to

underenforces existing protections; in light of limited resources, ramping up existing
procedures may have little practical effect.”).
258. King, supra note 99, at 42.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“Even in that universe of cases requiring court-appointed counsel,
the system has utterly failed to provide a robust and zealous defense for those accused of
crimes.”).
261. We acknowledge the concern that redefining crimes as civil violations may leave
people facing significant financial penalties without the right to counsel typically available in
criminal prosecutions. While that is a valid concern, it is less relevant here, as the
misdemeanor defendants who are the main focus of this Article are already not entitled to
counsel in spite of the fact that they are facing criminal charges.
As Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott have argued, substituting civil enforcement
tools for criminal prosecution of “public order” crimes would eliminate other process costs
and unnecessary harm to defendants as well. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs
and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268 (2015).
262. This Article does not address civil cases in which counsel may also be critical. The
Court’s most recent guidance with respect to the right to counsel in civil cases is Turner v.
Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), in which the Court held that “the Due Process Clause does not
always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is
threatened.” Id. at 446. Instead, the Court concluded, it “must take account of opposing
interests, as well as consider the probable value of ‘additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.’” Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
263. Decriminalization of some low-level offenses would also address, indirectly, the fact
that many municipal courts, often the site of misdemeanor adjudication, serve as revenue
collection centers. The Department of Justice’s report on law enforcement practices in
Ferguson, Missouri, for example, demonstrates the extent to which municipal courts use
“judicial authority as [a] means to compel the payment of fines and fees” in violation of due
process and equal protection requirements. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 145, at 3. The
issue of fines imposed for civil violations is, as mentioned above, also an important one.
However, it is outside the scope of this Article.
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A demand-side approach can be
achieve meaningful access.264
accomplished through the full decriminalization of specific offenses.265
This framework emphasizes a broader point: before discussing right to
counsel reform at any level, either with regard to improving enforcement of
the existing right or expanding the right, it is worth exploring why the
demand for counsel is so high.
One last note on the interplay between courts and legislatures is worth
keeping in mind. While decriminalization is ultimately a legislative task,
the legal standards implemented by the Court often force legislative change.
Thus, the first step of our proposal is directed to the judicial branch as well
as the legislative branch, while the second step would clearly be a task for
legislatures. As Justice Brennan noted in his Scott dissent:
It may well be that adoption by this Court of an “authorized
imprisonment” standard would lead state and local governments to reexamine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local government
might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for
certain minor offenses in light of the expense of meeting the requirements
of the Constitution. In my view this re-examination is long overdue. In
any event, the Court’s “actual imprisonment” standard must inevitably
lead the courts to make this re-examination, which plainly should more
properly be a legislative responsibility.266

Of course, the Court may be hesitant to reach the conclusion described
herein, in part because of the fiscal ramifications for the state in providing
264. One issue often raised with solutions based in equal protection is whether equality is
best achieved by “leveling up” and providing more benefits to those previously excluded or
“leveling down” to remove benefits from those previously favored. This concern is a
nonissue here, as forbidding a defendant from retaining counsel would be plainly
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly,
although equal protection has been emphasized throughout, the right of meaningful access to
courts described in Part III.A is not based solely in equal protection but also in due process.
See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221–27 (describing the basis of the access to courts line of
jurisprudence in both equal protection and due process); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 17 (1956) (“Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’” (quoting Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940))). The due process component of the access to courts
line of cases guarantees a floor and makes clear that the equal protection dilemma can only
be resolved in one direction.
265. Another possible alternative is statutorily eliminating incarceration and probated or
suspended sentences for certain classes of misdemeanor defendants. See, e.g., Hashimoto,
supra note 214, at 1042 (“Shelton, dependent as it is on the defendant’s sentence, offers
states a low-cost way to comply with the Constitution: eliminate incarceration and probated
sentences for low-level offenders.”). This option would at least eliminate manipulation of
the right to counsel at the whim of the judge and prosecutor. However, while satisfactory
under the Sixth Amendment, this alternative would do nothing to address the fact that in
cases either where the complexities of the required legal defense were beyond the layman or
severe consequences were still at stake from a conviction (including the stigma of the
conviction itself), most defendants would benefit significantly from legal representation. In
such cases, a defendant who was able would certainly hire private counsel. Thus, this option
would continue to condition meaningful access on wealth.
266. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 216.
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all defendants with meaningful access. As Justice Brennan also noted,
however, the “Court’s role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions
of state governments.”267 Thus, while pragmatic considerations may
influence the Court, it must remain focused on what is right from the
perspective of law and justice, not fiscal limitations.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment has largely occupied the field in defining the
states’ obligation to provide appointed counsel.268 Given that the Sixth
Amendment is the only constitutional provision that explicitly references
the right to counsel, this might appear logical. There are, however, practical
and conceptual advantages to invoking equal protection as a means to
challenge a state’s failure to provide counsel to those accused of crimes.
On a conceptual level, equal protection demands a different focus: rather
than emphasizing the presence of a lawyer and debating the relative
effectiveness of counsel, as the Sixth Amendment does, equal protection
centers attention on the fact that people are being denied meaningful access
to the criminal justice system because of their relative wealth. It thus
prompts us to think not about redrawing the line between groups of
defendants but about what can be done to avoid drawing a line among them
at all. For this reason, challenges rooted in equal protection often call for
systemic reform rather than the vindication of individual rights.269 States
faced with an equal protection challenge must either justify their choice to
engage in such systemic deprivation or alter the nature of how their system
provides benefits to indigents.
While Gideon promised equal treatment of defendants too poor to hire
their own attorney, that promise has been—and continues to be—denied to
many defendants, including Aubrey Scott. By reclaiming the potential of
the access to courts line of jurisprudence, we are hopeful that those who
have been left behind can find a new means for challenging systemic
indigent defense failures and bring Gideon’s promise from theory to reality.

267. Scott, 440 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1204 (describing how the Sixth Amendment has served
as the primary vehicle for indigent defendants to vindicate their right to an adequate
defense).
269. See id. at 1242–44 (contrasting equal protection’s focus on systemic deprivation and
structural change with the Sixth Amendment’s individual rights approach).

